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ABSTRACT 
 
Asset pricing has remained an issue of interest to scholars, investment managers and analysts without borders. 
Pricing  of  equities  in  environments  characterized  with  imperfect  information  and  determining  the  effect  of 
information asymmetry on the asset have also remained a challenge.   The risk the information uncertainty from 
the  firm  poses  to  the  investors  and  analysts  and  the  risk  the  information  uncertainty  from  the  investment 
opportunities of the firm poses to the managers need to be measured and incorporated into equity price. This 
study made an attempt to develop a model from the works of Lowry, Officer and Schwert (2007) and Reber and 
Fong (2008) for measuring the effect of firm and market-specific proxies of information asymmetry on equity 
prices in the stock market. The model developed is considered suitable for adoption in developing and emerging 
economies where information is considered prevalent.  In addition to providing a model for measuring the 
effects of proxies of information asymmetry on equity prices, the study would to literature on the subject of 
information  asymmetry  as  it  relates  to  equity  pricing  and  stock  market. 
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1.0   INTRODUCTION 
New  issues  are  made  primarily  to  raise  additional  funds  for  expansion,  diversification,  acquisition  of 
information  technology  infrastructures  and  others.  The  expectation  of  the  promoters  is  for  the  issue  to  be 
successful. Many factors can be responsible for the success or failure of new issues, one of such is pricing. 
Efficient pricing is important in attracting new and existing investors and may be enhanced by the quality of 
information disclosed to the market. A relationship exists between asset pricing and information quality (Kang, 
2004). It is expected that the quality of decision (output) is a reflection of the quality of information (input). The 
capital market to act as a catalyst for economic growth and development will depend, among other things, on the 
quality of market information available to investors. The ultimate is achieving information efficiency because 
each type of information asymmetry induces market inefficiency (Rosser, 2001; Oluba, 2008; Murray, 2008). 
The value of information may be determined by the quality of the decision made by the investors using the 
information. 
Information asymmetry has been identified as one of the challenges facing emerging markets (Rosser, 2001; 
Ciner and Karagozoglu, 2005; Oluba; 2008, and Murray, 2008) and especially where the market is found to be 
exhibiting  weak  form  efficient  (Olowe,  1999;  Adenikinju  and  Oyeranti,  2000  and  Elumilade,  2008).  Also, 
Lowry,  Officer  and  Schwert  (2008)  posit  that  pricing  of  initial  public  offer  is  a  complex  process  and  the 
complexity  of  the  valuation  problem  is  greater  in  firms  with  high  information  asymmetry.  Obviously,  the 
problem of information asymmetry is not restricted to the primary market rather it is market-wide especially 
where the market is considered to be weak-form efficient. This study therefore develops a model addressing the Australian Journal of Business and Management Research            Vol.1 No.2 |  May-2011                                     
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nature of effects that information asymmetry would have on equity pricing in both primary and secondary stock 
markets. Specifically, the model is designed to: 
i)  measure  the  impact  of  firm-specific  measures  (proxies)  of  information  asymmetry  on  the 
pricing of new equities (initial public offer), 
ii)  measure the impact of market-specific measures (proxies) of information asymmetry on the 
pricing of equities, and 
iii)  measure the relationship between initial returns on new equities (IPO), firm-specific proxies 
for information asymmetry and market volatility measures. 
The remainder of the study is set out as follows; Section Two contained discussion on the theoretical framework 
and review of relevant literatures. Section Three examined the methodology and models for measuring the effect 
of  the  firm  and  market-specific  proxies  of  information  asymmetry  on  equity  prices.  Lastly,  Section  Four 
contained summary, conclusion and recommendations. 
2.0   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1  Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework of this study is the theory of information as propounded by Akerlof (1970) who 
posits that the presence of information asymmetry in the market drives away new and good products from the 
market  in  favour of  used and bad ones. Akerlof developed a  model to explain  the concept of information 
asymmetry in the market for „‟Lemons‟‟ by using new and used car markets to explain how used cars can price 
out new ones  from the  market in the presence of asymmetric information. In such a market  used cars are 
overpriced  while  new  cars  are  underpriced.  With  presence  of  product  quality  uncertainty  (or  information 
asymmetry between the buyer and the seller), the market may be stuck in an “adverse selection” process with 
“good” quality products leaving and only “lemons” staying in the market, leading to market inefficiency and 
possibly a shutdown (Chen, 2005).   
Ever since the concept of information asymmetry or lemon market was introduced by Akerlof (1970), it has 
become the toast of many scholars cutting across several fields of human life, but unfortunately not so much has 
been done in the areas of equity pricing in the capital market. Several studies revealed that activities in the 
financial markets thrive on the amount and quality of information available to all the parties. This determines 
the efficiency of the market with the hindsight that it is not possible that all parties to a transaction would have 
the same amount of information available to them. Even where the same information is available, cognitive 
dissonance could set in. Most likely there would be varieties in the amount of information available. Information 
asymmetry is present in financial markets and its degree of presence varies from one economy to the other 
depending on the level of the economic or market development. Given this position, several attempts have been 
made by scholars to identify its impact on various financial market variables (Javid, 2009; Lowry, Officer and 
Schwert, 2007 and Reber and Fong, 2008). Myer and Majiluf (1985) examined information asymmetry between 
management and investors in the financial market and found information asymmetry playing important role in 
determining  a  firm‟s  financing  and  investment  decisions.  To  investors,  information  asymmetry  affects  the 
liquidity of a stock (Kyle, 1985) which in turn affects the cost of capital (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). 
Leland and Pyle (1977), Grossman and Hart (1981) and Myers and Majiluf (1985) proved theoretically that 
information asymmetries can have a profound impact on a firm‟s financing and investment decisions as well as 
on managerial incentive compensation policies. Leland and Pyle (1977) developed a model of capital structure 
and financial equilibrium to examine entrepreneurs intending to finance projects with certain prospects. They 
believe that information asymmetry may be the main reason behind the existence of market intermediaries. They 
considered an investment project with a capital outlay (K) with future return μ + χ, where μ and χ are the 
expected end-value of  the project and random  variable  with  mean and  variance equal zero. The investor‟s 
conviction  that  the  project  is  viable  is  demonstrated  by  his  investment  of  Australian Journal of Business and Management Research            Vol.1 No.2 |  May-2011                                     
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 and this according to them addresses the problem of adverse selection. The total market value (V) of the 
project is therefore expressed as:  
V ( ) = 1/(1+r) + [ µ(α) – λ]     .  .  .  .  (2.1) 
Where: 
  r   =  the riskless interest rate 
μ(a)  =  the market valuation schedule, expressing the market‟s  
perception of the true expected return as a function of 
, the fraction of equity retained by the entrepreneur 
λ  =  the market‟s adjustment for the risk of the project with  
   return x about the mean μ(a) was assumed to be a differentiable function 
 
Extending the frontier of impact of information on stock market activities, Myers and Majluf (1985) relying on 
Akerlof (1970), Leland and Pyle (1977) and Bhatacharya and Ritter (1983), among others, came up with a 
“three date model” to explain investment decision when the insiders have superior information than the outside 
investors. They discovered that it is better to issue bonds (safe securities) than equities (risky one) as means of 
giving the impression that all is well with the organization and indirectly issuing equity through conversion of 
bonds. It is better for a firm to forgo good investments when it has cash flow problems than to issue risky 
securities  to  finance  the  investments.  Low  and  non-declaration  of  dividend  is  one  of  the  ways  to  manage 
financial stress when investment opportunities are modest. Stock price tends to fall when new stocks are issued 
while insiders possess superior information and this  should be done if the  new issue  will  not put existing 
shareholders at a disadvantage. To the uninformed investor, refusal to make new issues signals positive news 
while the issuance of new equities signals bad news. In either case, prices of new issues are affected by the 
information asymmetry, which in turn affects the investment decision of the firm and resource allocation among 
investible opportunities in an economy.   
Easley and O‟Hara (2004) argued that information-based transactions in the financial market impacts on a firm‟s 
cost of capital. In spite of divergence of findings by the various scholars that have examined the effects and 
impact  of  information  asymmetry  on  the  determination  of  price,  interest  rate,  cost  of  capital  and  market 
efficiency,  there  is  the  consensus  among  them  that  the  degree  of  information  asymmetry  is  not  directly 
observable (Sufi, 2005; Karlan and Zinman, 2006), and that proxy variables are required to measure the degree 
of information asymmetry‟s presence in any market. Information asymmetry is characterized by two major 
problems  extensively  discussed  in  the  literature  as  adverse  selection  and  moral  hazard  (Knutsen,  2001). 
Decision makers (fund raisers and investors) in the primary and secondary markets can suffer from the two 
problems in a situation where information asymmetry exists and is left unmanaged. Borooah (2003), Bjornstad 
and  Brown  (2004),  Zerbe  and  McCurdy  (2005)  and  Hall  (2007)  see  market  failure  as  consequence  of 
information asymmetry. Thus confirming the position of Akerlof (1970) on how information asymmetry can 
lead to market failure. 
For instance, adverse selection occurs in primary equity market where insufficient information is available in 
fixing  the  offer  price.  If  the  new  issue  is  overpriced,  the  issuer  would  suffer  under-subscription  and  the 
opportunity offered by the proposed project becomes unrealizable. The far-reaching effect of this is that the lost 
opportunities may have adverse impact on existing investment.  On the other hand, the subscriber who did not 
have sufficient information to discover the overpriced stock would end up with less-than-expected return on the 
investment. A decision maker‟s ignorance of essential information may create moral hazard problem in addition 
to adverse selection effect (Caballero, 2008). 
2.2  Measurement of Information Asymmetry 
If  information  asymmetry  has  been  attributed  as  a  major  cause  of  market  failure,  its  impact  needs  to  be 
measured and empirically tested. Since the degree of information asymmetry is not directly observable, the use 
of proxies in the measurement of information asymmetry becomes essential (Sufi, 2005; Karlan and Zinman, 
2006). Variables such as research and development expenses, firm age, fixed assets, and firm size were used by Australian Journal of Business and Management Research            Vol.1 No.2 |  May-2011                                     
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Helwege and Liang (1996) as proxies for measuring information asymmetry. In earlier study, Klein and Belt 
(1994) adopted shareholders‟ size, market liquidity and the sales volume as measures of information asymmetry. 
Total  assets  of  the  firm  were  used  as  proxy  of  information  asymmetry  by  Jung,  King  and  Stulz  (1996).  
Analyst‟s coverage of stock prices has been used as proxy for measuring information asymmetry to stock price 
behavior in the stock market (Moyer, Chatfield and Sisneros, 1989; Barth and Hutton, 2004). Yi, Besley and 
Pantzalis (2005) modified the analyst coverage proxy to “change in analyst coverage” as a proxy for measuring 
information  generation  induced  by  securities  offers.  Moeller,  Schlingemann  and  Stulz  (2006)  used  the 
idiosyncratic volatility of the stock as a measure of information asymmetry with respect to diversity of opinion. 
Brown, Hillegeist and Lo (2006) conducted a time series analysis of the relationship between the earnings of a 
firm and changes in information asymmetry over a period of time using probability of uninformed trade.    
2.2.1  Firm’s Book Value to Market Value 
Book to market value ratio has been a tool in the hands of financial analysts for several purposes including using 
it to proxy information asymmetry, investment and growth opportunities of a firm. The managers of firms are 
considered to be better informed of the expected risk and returns of potential investment projects than the 
investors. Smith and Watts (1992) reasoned that managers of companies with high growth rate potentials seem 
to  possess  better  knowledge  of  the  companies‟  investment  opportunities  and  expected  future  cash  follows. 
McLaughlin, Safieddine and Vasudevan (1998) applied the ratio of firm‟s market value of equity to book value 
of  equity  to  measure  the  relationship  between  information  asymmetry  and  the  long-term  performance  of  a 
company following the public offer of ordinary shares. They found a direct correlation between information 
asymmetry and negative abnormal performance following the public offer of ordinary shares.  
 The higher the ratio of the book to market value (a signal of better performance and prospects to investors) the 
higher the expected return or equity price of a firm (Fama and French, 1992).  Moore and Beltz (2002) in their 
study of the factors that influence share price performance using S & P 500 index performance came to a 
conclusion that higher market value to book value ratio is a signal of better performance contrary to what Fama 
and French (1992) found. Higher market to book value and previous market values provide a good signal to 
some firms to issue equity rather than debt (Baker and Wurgler, 2002) Joos and Zhadanov (2007) developed a 
book and market values models for the valuation of earnings and equity of a Biotech Industry. They assumed 
that the book value and market value of a new start firm equal the value of the investment opportunities at given 
time, t. The value of the investment opportunities is the present value (PV) of the cash flows less the present 
value of the capital outlay.  The model depicting the value of the firm‟s growth option is  
GO (0)  =     
  
   
β1
 PV (x*)
 
   - 
  
    ………………………… (2.2) 
Where  x*  is  defined  as  “avg.  max  { 
 
   
β1
  PV  (xi)  representing  the  optimal  investment  threshold,  PV(x*) 
represents the value of the project initiated at a time when the current value of the stochastic revenue shock 
equals xi. The GA represents the total annual general and administrative expenses. The β1 is defined as   (
 
 )  
 (
 
  )   √
 
    
 
     
  
   
For a new firm, the cost of research and development and general and administrative expenses are paid from the 
shareholders‟  initial  capital  contributions  until  the  time  the  firm‟s  investment  opportunities  start  yielding 
revenues. At the point the investment opportunities start yielding revenue, the book value will not the equal to 
the  market  value  in  contrast  to  the  time  t  when  the  firm  started  without  any  revenue  from  investment 
opportunities. The market value thereafter is defined as: 
MV (t) = GO(t) +MV1(t) +MV2(t) +MV3(t) …………………… (2.3) 
where MV1, MV2, and MV3 represents  the contributions to the market value from investment projects in 
conception, those currently in the R&D stage, and projects in the commercial stage, respectively.  Australian Journal of Business and Management Research            Vol.1 No.2 |  May-2011                                     
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The model assumed that the market is efficient and both the management and the investors are equally informed 
or uninformed at any point in time. They acknowledged the presence of information asymmetry in Biotech 
Industry but decided to ignore it in the development of the model.  
In this study information asymmetry measures of a firm‟s growth and investment opportunities (especially the 
ratio of book value to market value) would be factored into the equity pricing model to be constructed for the 
purpose of striving at more efficient equity pricing.  
2.1.2  Analyst Forecast Proxy 
Analyst  earnings  forecast  is  an  important  ingredient  in  equity  valuation  (Shanthikumar,  2004;  Zaima  and 
Harjoto, 2005) for it helps to show the future expected earnings of the firm on the basis of forecast error.  The 
forecast error is the difference between the actual earnings and the analyst forecast earnings, which is useful for 
updating earnings expectations (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003). The stock prices incorporate earnings forecast 
(Bauman and Dowen, 1988; Bradshaw and Brown, 2005) and regarded as vital information in market decision 
making (Chung, McInish, Wood, and Wyhowski (1995). As the fiscal year ends, Elton, Gruber and Gultekin 
(1984) observed that forecast errors decrease because information asymmetry is less and accuracy in available 
information is higher. The analyst forecast reduces information asymmetry in the market (Hughes and Ricks, 
1987)  and  therefore  adopted  as  a  proxy  for  measuring  information  asymmetry  (Krishnaswami  and 
Subramaniam,  1999;  Gilson,  Healy,  Noe  and  Palepu,  2001;  Li  and  Zhao,  2008).    Krishnaswami  and 
Subramaniam (1999) used the analyst forecast error to test for change in the information environment before 
and after a spin-off transaction.  According to Bradshaw and Brown (2005), output from forecast analyst in 
predicting target prices of stocks, can be used to predict earnings, make stock recommendations and predict 
stock prices.  
So  much research evidence  abound on the importance of analyst forecasts to stock valuation, reduction of 
information asymmetry in the stock market and the information asymmetry that exists between the managers 
and the analysts (Kothari, Lewellen and  Warner, 2003; Lehar and  Randl, 2005; Bradshaw and Brown, 2005). 
Analysts  methods  of  earnings  and  returns  forecast  can  be  classified  into  the  fundamental  and  technical 
approaches. The fundamental analysis technique examines underlying (fundamental) factors using the economic 
and accounting indices that affect the firm‟s performance, growth and going concern.  Fundamental analysts 
believe the market price does not reflect the actual value of a stock, suggesting a mispricing of either under or 
overpriced stock. On the other hand, technical analysis dwells on predicting future prices from the historical 
market and stock (price and volume) behaviour. 
No  evidence  could  be  found  on  how  analysts‟  forecast  can  be  factored  into  equity  pricing  models  though 
research has also shown that there is instantaneous market reaction to analyst forecasts. The equity pricing 
model to be constructed would incorporate the analyst forecast as it helps to reduce information asymmetry in 
the stock market. One will ignore the observations made by earlier researchers that analyst‟s forecast in itself 
contains information asymmetry because of the information difference between managers and the analyst. The 
interest of this study, therefore, is not to examine or review analysts‟ forecast as a mean of predicting earnings 
or stock prices but its use as a proxy for information asymmetry can be deployed for a more efficient equity 
pricing. 
2.2.3  Standard Deviation - Information Asymmetry’s Proxy for Expected Return  
Stock expected returns are fraught with different levels of uncertainty in prediction. The higher the level of 
information  asymmetry  confronting  the  managers  and  investors,  the  greater  the  probability  of  inaccurate 
prediction of the expected stock returns by either of them. A common proxy for information asymmetry in the 
prediction of stock returns is the standard deviation which measures the volatility of the prices to changes in the 
underlying  factors.  Blackwell,  Marr  and  Spivey  (1990)  used  standard  deviation  as  a  proxy  to  measure  the 
residual volatility in daily stock returns while Kyle (1985) used a similar method to study informed trading with 
the expectation that the inability of non-insider to predict the firm‟s value accurately is directly and positively 
related to gains of insider traders.  It was concluded that for as long as residual volatility remains a function of Australian Journal of Business and Management Research            Vol.1 No.2 |  May-2011                                     
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uncertainty in the value of the firm, information asymmetry would continue to reflect the uncertainty.  The 
standard deviation of abnormal stock returns is a measure of information asymmetry in the stock market. Fee 
and Thomas (1999) adopted this method of measuring information asymmetry in the stock market and they 
discovered that volatility is significantly lower in diversified firms than those that were undiversified, where 
diversification is a ploy to manage uncertainty. 
There is positive correlation between expected stock returns and a firm‟s level of uncertainty (Kyle, 1985). 
Zhang (2004) posits that if the uncertainty associated with the impact of “good” information on stock return is 
high, it follows that the expected stock return  will be high and vice versa for “bad” information in a less 
information asymmetry environment. Information uncertainty has negative impact on expected stock returns if 
the information coming to the market is regarded as bad news while it leaves positive impact on the expected 
stock returns if the information is considered good. This means that the market overreacts to both the good and 
bad  information  in  an  environment  characterized  with  information  asymmetry.  Kelly  (2005)  examines 
information efficiency with regards to firm specific return variation and argues that incorporation of information 
to stock prices differs. Some stock price could be fast or slow to incorporate new information while some may 
not respond at all. He argues further that stock prices that are informationally efficiency (i.e. rapid response to 
new information) are a reflection of the quality of the firm‟s managerial decisions while also the informationally 
efficient stock provides positive signal to uninformed investors. 
The  risk  the  information  uncertainty  from  the  firm  poses  to  the  investors  and  analysts  and  the  risk  the 
information  uncertainty  from  the  investment  opportunities  of  the  firm  poses  to  the  managers  need  to  be 
measured  and  incorporated  into  equity  price.  Roll  (1988)  argues  that  systematic  risk  accounts  for  an 
insignificant portion of stock return volatility. This suggests something is missing. Could this be the neglect of 
the unsystematic risk which the earlier stock pricing models deliberately ignored? The capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM in its estimation of the expected stock return gives effect to only systematic risk which implies 
that stock price is not efficiently priced. The risk associated with the firm (unsystematic risk) cannot be ignored 
for an efficient pricing of equity if resource allocation among competing investment opportunities would be 
optimally allocated. The model to be constructed for the pricing of equity would include the unsystematic risk 
and investor recognition, which (investor recognition) Lehavy and  Sloan (2008) argue to be more important to 
stock price than information about market and firm fundamentals such as earnings, growth and investment 
opportunities. 
2.2.4  Microstructure of the Stock Market Proxy 
The last of the proxies to be considered in this study is in the measurement of information asymmetry on the 
stock  market  in  the  microstructure  of  the  market.  According  to  O‟Hara  (1995),  market  microstructure  is 
concerned with the process and outcomes of exchanging assets as guided by certain market rules and regulations 
and in some effects the formation of asset prices. Gravelle (1999) argues that a significant part of the researches 
on the microstructure of the securities markets was devoted to equity market. The outcomes of the many studies 
done on microstructure of equity markets include the development of several information asymmetry models to 
cater for segments of the equity markets that possess insider information about the stock expected value.    
In general terms, market organizations and structures have impact on stock prices. This position is of interest to 
scholars and market analysts following the October, 1987 astronomical fall in the Dow Jones Index (Naes and 
Skjeltorp, 2006). Issues in assessing the importance of market structures on price formation include the level of 
transparency and information disclosure by firms, the effects of centralized and decentralized trading systems, 
the effects of manual and electronic trading system on the stock pricing process. For instance, Mendelson (1987) 
argues that decentralized trading systems reduce liquidity but increases price volatility. The kernel therefore is 
that information asymmetry relating to volatility induced by market microstructures should be incorporated into 
pricing of stocks.  
Alford and Jones (1998) studied the effects of discrepancies in the registration and information requirements for 
foreign and local companies by the Securities and Exchange Commission on the adverse selection of investment 
portfolios.  They  discovered  no  relationship  between  relaxed  registration  and  information  requirements  for Australian Journal of Business and Management Research            Vol.1 No.2 |  May-2011                                     
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foreign investors and higher information asymmetry. In the same vein, Flannery, Kwan and Nimalendran (2000) 
did a study of asset structure of financial institutions in relation to the composition of their respective market 
microstructure characteristics. They discovered that there is a direct and proportionate relationship between 
domestic  and  non-performing  facilities  and  effective  bid  ask  prices.  In  another  study  using  the  proxy  of 
microstructure of the market to measure information asymmetry, Bates, Coughenour and Shastri (1999) studied 
the  composition  of  adverse  selection  spread  around  the  completion  of  a  spin-off.  They  discovered  that 
information asymmetry is lower following the completion of spin-off.  Brown and Hillegeist (2003) establish a 
negative correlation between firm‟s information disclosure quality and information asymmetry because private 
information decreases in relation to public information. The gap between informed and uninformed investor 
decreases as the firm increases its information disclosure. Deaves, Dine and Horton (2006) agree that increase 
information disclosure reduces information asymmetry in the market. 
All proxies are subjective and none could be an accurate measure of information asymmetry as it is directly 
unobservable. Reber and  Fong (2006) and Lowry, Officer and  Schwert (2008) in separate studies that involved 
measuring  information  asymmetry  with  respect  to  pricing  of  IPOs  adopted  direct  proxies  of  information 
asymmetry. Specifically, Reber  and  Fong (2006) in finding an explanation for mispricing of IPOs used offer 
price, firm value, underwriter reputation, subscription level and earnings per share (EPS) as some of the proxies 
of information asymmetry in determining  mispricing as a function of information asymmetry in the equity 
market.  Reber and Fong (2006) discovered that underpriced IPOs result in heavy trading in the secondary 
market.  Similarly, in the study of the variability of IPO initial returns Lowry, Officer and Schwert (2008) 
adopted the underwriter‟s rank (reputation), trade volume, firm age, market sector, price update and market 
listed and it was discovered that information asymmetry affect both the level of the offer price and the precision 
of the price-setting process and also the IPOs of technology companies that enjoys venture capital and younger 
companies are most underpriced. 
3.0  METHODOLOGY AND MODEL SPECIFICATION  
 
Reber and Fong (2006) developed a model to examine the effect of firm-specific information asymmetry on IPO 
initial return dispersion. The model shows the IPO‟s returns and risk level depend on certain firm- specific 
characteristics. The characteristics were used by the authors to proxy for information asymmetry.  
 
The model of Reber and Fong (2006) is as stated: 
IRi   =   β0 + β1Ranki + β2Log(Sharesi) + β3Techi + β4VCi + β5 NYSEi +  
Β6NASDAQi + β7Log(Firm Agei +1) + β8 IPrice UpdateiI + €I.  . (3.1) 
Where: 
Rank  :  The  underwriters‟  rank  as  obtained  from  reputable  raters.  It  is  assumed  that  highly  ranked 
underwriters are able to make precise estimate of firm value. Better estimate (underwriters rank) would 
have directly positive correlation with IPO pricing. Substitutes to the underwriters can be made of 
issuing houses that equally play vital roles in the initial public offers.  
Log (Share): This is the logarithm of the number of shares offered in the IPO. It is assumed that less information 
tends to be available about smaller offers and valuations of such issues are difficulty.  
Tech:  This equals 1 if the firm is a high tech industry (biotech, computer equipment, electronics) and zero (0) 
otherwise. It is assumed that the value of technology firms tends to be much harder to estimate because 
it depends on growth option 
VC:  This  equals  1  if  the  firm  received  financing  from  venture  capitalists  prior  to  the  IPO  and  zero 
otherwise. It is assumed that if venture capitalists share information about the firm, the issuing houses 
may be better to estimate firm value for such issues. This variable would be replaced with public 
declaration [Log(PUB)] by the issuing house to underwrite the IPO if it fails. It is therefore assumed 
that public declaration to underwrite the IPO would have positive correlation with the price. Public 
declaration to underwrite is 1 otherwise zero.  Australian Journal of Business and Management Research            Vol.1 No.2 |  May-2011                                     
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Log (Firm Age + 1): This equals the logarithm of (1 plus) the number of years the firm was established as at the 
time of issuing the IPO 
I Price Update I: This is the absolute value of the percentage change between the offer price and the middle of 
the range of prices in the prospectuses. This proxy can be substituted the natural log of offer price of 
the IPO [Log(OP)] (Reber and Fong, 2008). 
NASDAQ: This equals 1 if the IPO is listed on NASDAQ and zero (0) otherwise. We would substitute this 
proxy with 2
nd Tier Market of the NSE (2
nd Tier). Small and young firms tend ton list the 2
nd Tier and it 
is assumed that issuing houses would find it difficult to value these firms 
NYSE: This equals 1 if the IPO is listed on the NYSE and zero otherwise. This proxy would be substituted with 
1
st Tier of the NSE (1
st Tier). Big and old firms tend to go public on NYSE and it is assumed that 
issuing houses would be able to value the firms more precisely 
Eqn (3.1) is expanded to accommodate some of the proxies of information asymmetry examined by Reber and 
Fong (2006): 
IRi  =     β0 + β1Ranki + β2Log(Sharesi) + β3Techi + β4PUBi + β5 1
stTieri +  
Β62
ndTieri  +  β7Log(Firm  Agei  +1)  +  β8Log(OPi)  +  β9Log(Vi)  +  β10Log(EPSi)  + 
β11Log(Voli) + β12Log (SUBSi) + €I   .   . (3.2) 
Where:  
Log(V):   This is the firm market value on the first day of trading in the secondary market 
Log(EPS):   This is earnings per share in the accounting period immediately before the IPO 
Log (Vol):   This is the number of shares traded on the first day of trading divided by the total number of 
shares offered in the IPO. This is to determine the first investors‟ response in the secondary 
market 
Log(SUBS):   This is the number of times an IPO was oversubscribed ( > 1) or undersubscribed (< 1)   
To correct for autocorrelation of the residuals in equation (3.2), we adapt the autoregression moving average 
(ARMA 1,1) model of Box and Jenkins (1976) and also used by Lowry, Officer and Schwert (2009).  
Logδ
2(€i) =   Y0 + Y1Ranki + Y2Log(Sharesi) + Y3Techi + Y4VCi + Y51
stTieri +  
Y62
ndTieri + Y7Log(Firm Agei +1) + Y8Log(OPi) + Y9Log(Vi) + Y10Log(EPSi) + 
Y11Log(Voli) + Y12Log (SUBSi).  .   .   .     (3.3) 
  
 
To also correct for autocorrelation in the conditional variance of the residuals from the mean in equation (3.2), 
we introduce the exponential general autocorrelation conditional heteroscedasticity (EGARCH) model (Nelson, 
1991). 
Log(δ
2) =  ψ +  Log[€i - 1
2/ δ
2(€i – 1)] + δLog(δ
2
t - 1)   .   .  .  . .   .  (3.4) 
 
and, the variance (€i) of the error of the mean in eqn (3.2) is the product of the EGARCH factor from eqn (3.4) 
and the cross sectional factor from eqn (3.3).  
Var(€i) =     δ
2
t (δ
2)(€i)   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  (3.5)
   
 
For the primary market analysis, equations (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4) will be used to regress the proxies of the 
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  For the secondary market analysis (hypothesis H0b) and the “entire” equity market analysis (hypothesis 
H0c), the same equations (3.2, 3.3 and 3.4) would be run but using market-specific and “entire” equity market 
(i.e. firm and market) information asymmetry proxies respectively. 
 
The following are the market-specific proxies of information asymmetry to be used: 
Log(SI):  This is the logarithm of the Stock Exchange Share Index as a proxy for equity prices in the 
secondary market.  
Log(DEAL): This is the logarithm of the total number of deals (annually) recorded by the  
market for equities. The number of deals traded is assumed to be a function of informed 
trading and this is expected to be positively correlated with equity prices 
Log(GDP):   This is the logarithm of the yearly Gross Domestic Product. This is expected to have positive 
correlation with equity prices 
Log(INT) :  This is the logarithm of the (annualized) lending interest rate. It is assumed that interest rate 
would have negative correlation with equity prices in the stock market 
Log(OIL):   This is the logarithm of the (annualized) crude oil price. It is assumed that the price of crude 
oil is positively correlated with the equity prices 
Log(INFL):  This  is  the  logarithm  of  the  inflation  rate.  Inflation  affects  the  investing  ability  in  the 
economy. It is assumed that inflation is negative correlated with equity prices 
Log (CONI): This is the logarithm of the (annual) consumer index. It is assumed that consumption is positively 
correlated with equity prices. 
Log(FX):  This is the logarithm of the foreign exchange rate to the country whose currency serves as the 
benchmark  like  United  States  of  America  dollars  (USD).  It  is  assumed  that  a  positive 
correlation exist between foreign exchange rate and equity prices. 
The model to be tested in the secondary market is: 
Log(ASI) = f[(Log(DEAL), Log(GDP), Log(INT), Log(OIL), Log(INFL), Log (CONI), Log(FX)] 
In a linear expression where more than two variables are deployed, multicollinearity between variables 
may not be ruled out. To explain the effects of multicollinearity normally associated with multi-variables in 
cross-sectional regression analysis, multicollinearity test should be conducted to explain the extent of correlation 
between the independent variables. 
Several methods exist to establish correlation and autocorrelation between the dependent variables. The 
variance inflation factor method, [VIF(βi)] = 1/1 – Ri
2   is  preferred  for  ease  of  adaption  and 
interpretation.  In  the  alternative  and  for  further  confirmation  of  results  of  VIF  method,  the  tolerance  level 
method, (1 - Ri
2) <  0.1 is equally preferred for the same reasons. Where Ri
2 is the coefficient of determination 
derived from the cross-sectional regression analysis of each of independent variables. The multicollinearity 
would be considered strong if VIF(βi) ≥ 10 (Kennedy, 2003) 
 
4.0  CONCLUSION 
 
Studies  that  empirically  tested  the  impact  of  information  asymmetry  on  equity  pricing  in  emerging  and 
developing economies, where market efficiency are mostly in the semi-strong and weak forms are very few. The 
shortage of such studies could not be divorced from lack of testable models to accommodate the peculiarity of 
market data in such informational inefficient markets. Also, is of importance to note that direct proxies of 
information  asymmetry  produce  verifiable  and  less  subjective  outcomes  than  proxies  derived  from  data 
manipulation, therefore identifying and selecting the firm and market-specific proxies require the understanding 
of the firm and market dynamics that impact significantly on equity pricing. The models derived can be tested in 
emerging economies that most studies examining the impact of information asymmetry on equity pricing have Australian Journal of Business and Management Research            Vol.1 No.2 |  May-2011                                     
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neglected for reasons not various reasons including inability to assess testable models. The study has contributed 
to existing literatures in providing a platform for measuring the effect of information asymmetry on equity 
prices both in the primary and secondary markets of emerging economies.  
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